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INTRODUCTION

During the last fifteen years, the United States and the
world as a whole have experienced dramatic advances in
technology and exponential increases in Internet usage.1 "There
are now approximately one billion web pages on the Internet"2
3
and over 203 million Internet users in the United States alone.
4
These users access the Web, on average, more than once a day
for a multitude of purposes, including shopping, transacting
business, and accessing news and information. 5 However, as the
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1999,
Brandeis University.
1 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("The Internet has experienced
'extraordinary growth.' The number of'host' computers.., increased from about 300
in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by ... 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts are
located in the United States."); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d
1312, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2002), appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004). In one
year alone, from 2002 to 2003, global wireless Internet usage increased by 145%,
representing seventy-nine million users in 2003. Converging Markets, Competing
Technologies Mark Wireless Internet,DCD Bus. REP., May 24, 2004.
2 Jeffrey Scott Ranen, Note, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA
Applicability to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 390 (2002) (citing
Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the Right Job, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 191,
195 (2000)).
3 Nielsen//NetRatings, Net View Usage Metrics, http://www.nielsennetratings.
com/news.jsp?section=datto&country=us (last visited Nov.5, 2005).
4 Id.
5 John Grady & Jane Boyd Ohlin, The Application of Title III of the ADA to
Sport Web Sites, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 145, 145 (2004); Adam M. Schloss,
Web-Sight for Visually-Disabled People: Does Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Apply to Internet Websites?, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 35
(2001). Internet shopping has become big business-total online spending in 2004
grew by 26% for the year to a record level of more than $117 billion. Online Holiday
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Internet has become increasingly sophisticated and relied upon,
much of its content has become inaccessible to individuals with
disabilities, particularly those with auditory, visual, or muscular
impairments.6
This information accessibility problem has
become known as the "digital divide," 7 and has generally been
caused by the recent and rapid transition of the Internet from a
text-based format to an increasingly multimedia-based format.8
This transition in format has lead to increased inaccessibility
because multimedia websites are generally incompatible with the
assistive technologies employed by visually impaired Internet
users. 9 The most common incompatibility problem arises with
text-to-speech software which cannot readily translate a pure
graphical image into words; 10 thus, while it is often said that a
picture is worth a thousand words, it is not even worth one to the
visually impaired Internet user. One study has estimated that,

Spending Surges Beyond Expectations, Driving E-Commerce to Record Annual Sales
of $117 Billion, PR NEWSWIRE U.S., Jan. 10, 2005.
6 See Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct in Cyberspace:
Applying the "Nexus"Approachto PrivateInternet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963,
963 (2004); Charles D. Mockbee IV, Comment, Caught in the Web of the Internet: The
Application of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct to Online Businesses, 28 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 553, 554 (2004) (citing Adam M. Schloss, Web-Sight for Visually-Disabled
People: Does Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act Apply to Internet
Websites?, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 35 (2001)).
7 See Moberly, supra note 6, at 963 (citing Andrew G. Celli, Jr. & Kenneth M.
Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the Digital Divide, 20 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 53, 53-54 (2002)); Justin D. Petruzzelli, Note, Adjust Your Font Size:
Websites are Public Accommodations Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2001).
8 Petruzzelli, supra note 7, at 1065 (citing Applicability of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct (ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 13 (2000) (statement of
Dr. Steven Lucas, Vice President, Privaseek, Inc.)).
9 See Schloss, supra note 5, at 36. Some of the assistive technologies used by the
visually impaired include voice-dictation software, which converts the user's speech
into written text; voice-navigation software, which allows users to open and close
software applications upon verbal command; text-to-speech software, which converts
on-screen text (including Internet text) into computer speech; magnification
software, which increases the size of on-screen computer text; and braille-conversion
software, which utilizes a keyboard-like piece of hardware to convert text into
braille. Id. at 35.
10 See Petruzzelli, supra note 7, at 1065 (quoting Applicability of the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct (ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 7 (2000)
(statement of Gary Wunder, Programmer Analyst-Expert, ITS-Hosp Bus. Apps,
Univ. of Mo.) ('Computer technology is not yet sufficiently advanced to recognize a
picture and tell us that what [sic] appears on the screen."')).
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as a result of the incompatibility problems of the "digital divide,"
98% of websites are, to some extent, inaccessible 1 to the
approximately 1.5 million visually disabled individuals who
regularly use the Internet.12
In order to gain greater access to the content of the Internet,
visually disabled individuals have filed lawsuits pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 13 to compel website
providers to utilize formats that are more compatible with
assistive technologies.' 4 The ADA was enacted in 1990 by the
United States Congress for the purpose of providing "a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 5
The
relevant subsection of the ADA in the majority of these cases is
Title III, which states that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation."' 6 Thus,
in order to succeed on a Title III claim, a plaintiff must establish
that a website falls within the purview of the ADA by virtue of
being a "place of public accommodation" or a "service" provided
by a "place of public accommodation" as contemplated by the
Act. 17 The main point of contention is the scope of the term
"place of public accommodation"-specifically, whether it is
narrowly limited to physical locations that do business on an in11 See Ranen, supra note 2, at 390 (citing Sally McGrane, Is the Web Truly
Accessible to the Disabled?, Jan. 26, 2000, http://www.cnet.com4520-6022_1105103.html).
12 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (S.D. Fla.
2002), appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
14 See Access Now, Inc. v. Claire's Stores, Inc., No. 00-14017-CIV, 2002 WL
1162422, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2002); Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1314-16;
Martin v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1366 (N.D. Ga.
2002). In 1999, the National Federation for the Blind sued'America Online, Inc.
("AOL") for similar incompatibility issues; the National Federation later agreed to
drop the suit on the condition that AOL modify its software to become compatible
with the leading text-to-sound programs and braille-conversion devices. See Schloss,
supra note 5, at 36 (citing Jonathan Bick, Americans with DisabilitiesAct and the
Internet, 10 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 205, 217-19 (2000)); Patrick Maroney, The Wrong
Tool for the Right Job, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 191, 194 (2000); Ritchenya A.
Shepherd, AOL Suit by the Blind Could Have Wide Impact, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov.
16, 1999, at 3.
15 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
16 Id. § 12182(a).
17 See Mockbee, supra note 6, at 555.
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person basis or whether it also includes various intangible
8
entities, such as the Internet.1
Recently, in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 19 the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida was asked to
rule on this issue and declined to apply the ADA to a private
commercial website operated by Southwest Airlines. 20
In
dismissing the case, the court applied a narrow reading of the
statute and held that "to fall within the scope of the ADA as
presently drafted, a public accommodation must be a physical,
concrete structure" 21 which the consumer must enter to enjoy the
goods and services provided therein. 22
Therefore, because
websites are not physical places, they are not covered by the
ADA. 23 In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim upon an alternative "nexus" theory in that they
failed to "demonstrate that Southwest's website impedes their
access to a specific, physical, concrete space such as a particular
airline ticket counter or travel agency." 24 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals later affirmed the district court's dismissal of
25
the action.
18 Matthew A. Stowe, Interpreting"Placeof Public Accommodation" Under Title
III of the ADA: A Technical Determination with Potentially Broad Civil Rights
Implications, 50 DUKE L.J. 297, 298 (2000).
19 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002), appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th
Cir. 2004).
20 Id. at 1314.
21 Id. at 1318.
22 This "in-person" requirement of the definition of "public accommodation" is
implied from the court's rationale that '"Title III of the ADA governs solely access to
physical, concrete places of public accommodation." Id. (emphasis added). The court
rejected the holding in CarpartsDistributionCenter, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's
Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994), that Title III of the ADA
applies to discrimination in the access to employee medical benefit plans, even if the
plans themselves are not purchased or sold on an in-person basis at a physical
location.
23 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
24 Id. at 1321.
25 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1325 (llth Cir. 2004). In
dismissing the action, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs'
claim because, at the appellate level, the plaintiffs abandoned the claim that they
made before the District Court-that southwest.com, individually, as a website, is a
place of public accommodation and should be governed by the ADA. Id. at 1326-27.
In its place, the plaintiffs raised a new argument on appeal pursuant to the "nexus"
theory-"that Southwest Airlines as a whole is a place of public accommodation
because it operates a 'travel service,' and that it has violated Title III precisely
because of the web site's connection with Southwest's 'travel service."' Id. at 1328
(emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit declined to entertain this new theory
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This Comment agrees with the district court's result that,
based on the arguments presented at trial, Southwest Airlines'
website, by itself, is not a public accommodation within the
meaning of the ADA, but disagrees with the court's rigid "inperson" requirement for public accommodations and its narrow
interpretation of the "nexus" theory. The court's interpretation of
the ADA renders the law inapplicable to discrimination that does
not prevent physical access to a concrete place of "public
accommodation," 26 and thus its reasoning is flawed in two
respects. First, it does not comport with the plain meaning,
stated purpose, and legislative history of the statute. 27 And
second, it fails to account for a significant volume of prior case
law involving the application of the ADA to intangible products
and services offered by "public accommodations" that do not
conduct their businesses on an in-person basis. 28 Part I of this
Comment examines the methodology the district court employed
in reaching its decision. Part II exposes the inherent flaws in the
court's reasoning by analyzing the effects of the district court's
failure to properly apply cardinal maxims of statutory
interpretation and prior case law. It also discusses the "nexus"
approach and examines why the plaintiffs lost their case, as well

and, accordingly, dismissed the case because the district court did not have the
initial opportunity to perform the fact-intensive analysis required for a decision on
the merits. Id. at 1331 (citing Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991))).
26 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
27 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
28 See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying
Title III to insurance underwriting based on the existence of a safe harbor
provision); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994); Winslow v. IDS Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d.
557, 563 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that the ADA is applicable to insurance policies
and not limited to access to actual physical structures); Chabner v. United of Omaha
Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D. Cal 1998) (holding that Title III applies
to insurance underwriting practices and not mere barriers to physical entry);
Conners v. Me. Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 1999) (applying the holding
from Doukas); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1322 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that the ADA applies to the denial of a life insurance policy, and not
mere denial of physical access to the place of accommodation where the policy is
generated-the insurance office); Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,
425-26 (D.N.H. 1996) (holding that Title III extends to the substance and contents of
an insurance policy); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94-C4416, 1995 WL 573430
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (holding that the ADA does not require a plaintiff to be
physically present at a place of public accommodation in order to be entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment).

1318

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1313

as hypothesizes about whether a proper application of the
"nexus" theory would have changed the outcome. Finally,
Part
III raises concerns if a blanket application of the ADA were
imposed on all websites, as advocated by some commentators.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
A. Statement of the Facts
Access Now, Inc., a Florida non-profit "ADA advocacy
organization," 29 and Robert Gumson, a blind individual, filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against
Southwest Airlines, Co. 30
The plaintiffs asserted that the
airline's website, southwest.com, excluded them in violation of
the ADA, as the goods and services offered online at its "virtual
ticket
counters"
are
inaccessible
to blind
persons. 3 1
Southwest.com offers "sighted" consumers the means to purchase
tickets, hotel stays, and car rentals, check airline fares and
schedules, and stay up-to-date on sales and promotions. 32
However, visually impaired individuals, who rely on screen
reader technology, are unable to access these goods and services
online because the website fails to provide "alternative text"
which a screen reader program could use to communicate to its
user what is graphically displayed on the website. 33 Although
the plaintiffs did not argue that they are unable to access these
goods and services via alternative means, such as by telephone,
or physically visiting an airline ticket counter or travel agency, 34
29 Access Now, Inc. is designated as a 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the

IRS and is directed solely by non-paid volunteers; the goal of the organization is to
create awareness about the need for ADA compliance and to initiate legal
proceedings when necessary to achieve that goal. See ADA Access Now,
http://www.adaaccessnow.org/home.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
30 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
31 Id.
32 Id.

at 1315. Nearly half of the airline's passenger revenue is generated by
online bookings via southwest.com. Id. Additionally, the airline boasts more than 3.5
million subscribers to its weekly "Click 'N Save" e-mails. Id.
33 Id. at 1316.
34 Id. at 1316 n.3. Even if plaintiffs are able to access these goods and services
by alternative means, this does not dispose of their suit, since Title III prohibits
places of public accommodation from providing unequal or separate benefits to
persons with disabilities unless such alternative means are absolutely necessary in
order to make such benefits accessible. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1) (2000).
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they submitted that visually impaired individuals are subject to
price discrimination as they are unable to take advantage of webmoved to dismiss
only specials. 35 In response, Southwest Airlines
36
granted.
was
the complaint and its motion
B. The District Court's Opinion
In the absence of Eleventh Circuit precedent on the
applicability of the ADA to websites, the district court viewed
this case as one of first impression. 37 As such, the court
First, whether Southwest's website
identified two issues.
public accommodation" within the
of
constitutes "a place
38
of statutory interpretation.
question
meaning of the ADA-a
And second, in the alternative, whether the plaintiffs established
a sufficient "nexus" between southwest.com and "a place of public
39
accommodation."
In addressing the first issue, the district court concluded
that the term "public accommodation" only includes "physical,
concrete structures" 40 in which business is conducted on an inperson basis. 41 In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked
to the term in dispute and concluded that where a "plain and
unambiguous meaning" is present, no further analysis is
needed. 42 In performing this step, the court noted that the ADA
specifically identifies twelve categories of places of "public
43 To
accommodation," all of which enumerate physical locations.
35 Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice at
7, Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (No.
02-21734).
36 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
37 Id. at 1315.
38 Id. at 1317.
39 Id. at 1319.
40 Id. at 1318 (citing Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283-84
(11th Cir. 2002)).
41 See supra note 22.
42 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (citing Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283
n.6 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))).
43 Id. The twelve categories of "public accommodations," as enumerated by the
ADA:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging...
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store... shopping center or other
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supplement the text of the ADA, the court looked to the
applicable federal regulations issued by the Attorney General
which define a "place of public accommodation" as "a facility,
operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce
and fall within at least one of the [twelve enumerated categories
set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)]."44 The district court concluded
that the word "facility 45 in this definition, coupled with the
Eleventh Circuit's previous interpretations of the ADA,46 was
dispositive of "Congress' clear intent that Title III of the ADA
governs solely access to physical, concrete places of public
accommodation." 47 Therefore, because Internet websites are
neither among the enumerated categories of the ADA nor
"physical, concrete structures," they are not covered
by Title III. 4 11
Notwithstanding this analysis, the court then addressed the
plaintiffs' creative argument that the website falls within the
scope of Title III because it is a place of "exhibition, display and a
sales establishment"-all specifically enumerated in the
statute. 49 In rejecting this argument, the court turned to the
sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry cleaner, bank.... travel service, shoe repair
service ....office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance
office ....hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or post graduate
private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter,.., or other
social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
44 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (quoting 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104).
45 The word "facility" in this definition is defined as "all or any
portion of
buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other
conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal
property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is
located." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2004).
46 See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283; Stevens v. Premier Cruises,
Inc., 215 F.3d
1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[b]ecause Congress has provided such a
comprehensive definition of 'public accommodation' we think that the intent of
Congress is clear enough").
47 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
48 Id.
49 Id.; see also supra note 43 (discussing the enumerated categories of public
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interpretive maxim of ejusdem generis--"where general words
follow a specific enumeration.. . the general words should 'be
50
limited to ...things similar to those specifically enumerated."'
Applying this maxim, the court noted that all of the specifically
enumerated terms were physical, concrete structures; therefore,
the general terms, "exhibition," "display," and "sales
establishment" must be limited to physical, concrete structures
51
as well.
As an alternative means of applying the ADA to Southwest's
website, the court then considered, sua sponte, the second
issue-whether the plaintiffs established a sufficient "nexus"
between southwest.com and a physical, concrete place of public
accommodation. 52 Because the plaintiffs made no effort to
establish such a "nexus" at the district court level and limited
their arguments to evoking persuasive authority to expand the
53
ADA's application to websites as entities unto themselves, the
court found that the necessary "nexus" was lacking in order for
the plaintiffs to state a claim. 54 Pursuant to their strategy, the
plaintiffs cited the First Circuit's decision in Carparts
Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New
England55 and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co., 56 which point to the term "travel service"
among the list of enumerated "public accommodations" as
evidence that Congress intended this section of the ADA to be
read broadly to include providers of services that "do not require
57
a person to physically enter an actual physical structure." The
accommodations).
50 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (quoting Allen v. A.G. Thomas, 161
F.3d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
581-82 (1981))).
51 Id. at 1319.
52 Id.

53 Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs did put forth arguments to establish a "nexus"
between southwest.com and Southwest Airlines as a physical place of public
accommodation; however, these arguments were rejected, as they were never
developed at the district court level. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 385
F.3d 1324, 1325 (llth Cir. 2004).
54 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
55 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
56 Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). Doe
approvingly cites to Carpartsfor this proposition. See id. at 559; see also infra notes
112-13 and accompanying text.
57 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 n.8 (quoting Carparts,37 F.3d at
19) ('By including 'travel service' among the list of services considered 'public
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plaintiffs then argued that the Eleventh Circuit's previous
holding in Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions58 was aligned with
decisions of the First and Seventh Circuits, and therefore was
binding authority on the issue of the applicability of the ADA to
non-physical accommodations. 59
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments for two
reasons.
First, the court felt that the issue of statutory
interpretation had already been resolved by the "plain meaning"
approach; therefore, it was not necessary to refute the
interpretations of the ADA contained in Carparts or Doe. 60
Instead, the court characterized those interpretations as dicta, as
those cases did not specifically address the ADA's application to
the Internet, 6 1 and cursorily dismissed them by saying "the
Eleventh Circuit has not read Title III of the ADA nearly as
broadly as the First Circuit."62 Second, the court challenged the
plaintiffs' assertion that Rendon adopted the interpretation
contained in Carpartsby stating that "Rendon not only did not
approve of Carparts,it failed to even cite it."63 The court then
distinguished Rendon, which found for the plaintiffs based on the
"nexus" approach, by declaring that the determinative
factor in
that case was that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the
challenged service limited their access to a physical place of
public accommodation.64 Here, the plaintiffs only contended that
their access to "virtual ticket counters" was limited. 65 Therefore,
because cyberspace is located in "no particular geographical
accommodations,' Congress clearly contemplated that 'service establishments'
include providers of services which do not require a person to physically
enter an
actual physical structure."').
58 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
In Rendon,
plaintiffs with hearing and upper-body mobility impairments sued the producers
of
the television show, "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire," claiming that the use
of the
"fast finger" telephone selection process violated the ADA. Id. at 1280. The
court
held the "fast finger" process was a discriminatory screening mechanism
that
deprived the plaintiffs of the opportunity to compete for the privilege of
being a
contestant on the Millionaire program-a show that is filmed in a physical television
studio. Id. at 1285.
59 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
60 Id. at 1319.
61 The issues in Carpartsand Doe concerned the ADA's application to employee
health benefit plans offered through the plaintiffs' employers. See infra notes
99105, 112-13 and accompanying text.
62 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
63 Id. at 1320.
64 Id.; see also supra note 58.
65 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.

20051

ACCESS NOW, INC. V. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, CO.

1323

location," the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Southwest's
website impeded their access to any specific physical space, such
as a "real" airline ticket counter or travel agency. Thus, they
failed to establish the sufficient "nexus" required to invoke Title
66
III of the ADA.
II. FLAWS IN THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION
A. CardinalMistakes in Statutory Interpretation
The district court improperly read an "in-person"
requirement into the definition of "public accommodation" under
the ADA.6 7 This interpretation is flawed in several respects.
First, in interpreting the term "public accommodation," the court
only analyzed § 12181(7) of the ADA and its parallel regulation
in the Federal Register, 68 and it did so in isolation of any other
provisions of Title 111.69 Nevertheless, even when viewed in
isolation, the statutes do not explicitly impose, nor even hint at,
7°
an "in-person" requirement as conjured by the district court.
Such an isolated analysis is not only incomplete, but ignores the
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that "statutory language
must be read in context." 71 The context here is provided by other
provisions of Title III. One such provision, § 12182(b)(1)(a)(i),
implicitly suggests that the district court's interpretation is
incorrect. That section reads, "[i]t shall be discriminatory to
subject an individual.., on the basis of a disability... to a
denial of the opportunity.., to participate in or benefit from the
72 Applying the court's own
goods [or] services ...of an entity."
"plain and unambiguous meaning' test to the phrase "of an
Id. Even if the plaintiffs in Access Now were able to show that the website
impeded their access to a particular Southwest aircraft, the district court would
likely not have applied the ADA anyway because aircrafts are explicitly exempt from
Title III. Id. at 1321 n.12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) (2000)).
67 See supra note 22.
68 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2004).
69 Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1317-18.
70 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000). A review of the statute reveals that it contains no
explicit text that requires the entity to provide its goods and services on an "inperson" basis in order to be considered a "public accommodation" within the meaning
of the Act.
71 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004) (quoting
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))).
72 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
66

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

1324

[Vol. 79:1313

entity," there is strong reason to infer that it would be
discrimination under the ADA for an entity to deny to protected
individuals any and all goods or services offered by the entity
regardless of whether they are purchased or consumed "inperson" at the entity. Had the legislature intended to impose an
"in-person" requirement, it would presumably have used the
phrase "at an entity."73
The district court also ignored a second maxim of statutory
interpretation-that courts should interpret statutes "so as to
avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof."74 The district
court's "in-person" requirement would violate this maxim by
rendering meaningless many provisions of the ADA. First, only
two of the five provisions that define prohibited discrimination
under the Act explicitly refer to physical barriers. 75 Thus, the
remaining three provisions, which extend the definition of
discrimination beyond denial of physical access to a place of
public accommodation, would be rendered meaningless. 7 6 For
73 See

Memorandum

in Response

to Motion to Dismiss

Complaint

with

Prejudice, supra note 35, at 9 (positing alternate language Congress could have used
had it intended to restrict the ADA's application to only those services provided "at"
a place of public accommodation); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33
(2d Cir. 1999).
The term 'of generally does not mean 'in,' and there is no indication that
Congress intended to employ the term in such an unorthodox manner ....
Furthermore, many of the private entities that Title III defines as 'public
accommodations'-such as a 'bakery, grocery store, clothing store,
hardware store, [or] shopping center,' as well as a 'travel service, . . . gas
station, office of an accountant or lawyer, [or] pharmacy,' sell goods and
services that are ordinarily used outside the premises.
Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
74 Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190
(N.D. Cal.
1998) (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)
(citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955))).
75 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A). Discrimination includes:
(iv) a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers
that are structural in nature, in existing facilities ...where such removal
is readily achievable; and
(v) where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier under
clause (iv) is not readily achievable, a failure to make such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through
alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable.
Id.
76 See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316,
1322 (C.D. Cal.
1996). Title III of the ADA also contains these specific prohibitions:
(i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals
with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services,
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example, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) explicitly prohibits "the imposition or
application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen
out an individual with a disability ... ,7 Thus, an entity that
qualifies as a physical place of public accommodation could,
theoretically, impose discriminatory eligibility criteria that do
not relate to physical access, but such criteria would be
78 For instance, the
prohibited by § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) of the ADA.
ADA would undeniably prohibit a health club, which is
nonetheless to sell
completely physically accessible, from refusing
79
wheelchairs.
in
individuals
to
memberships
Second, these provisions are also necessary to effectuate the
of individuals who suffer from non-physical
ADA's protection
80
handicaps.
If Title III is violated only by discrimination that prevents
physical access to a place of public accommodation, then many
persons who do not suffer from a physical handicap but are
explicitly protected by Title III could bring a Title III claim only
took affirmative steps to block such
if the public accommodation
81
persons' physical access.
Such a result is not only absurd, but would also render
superfluous the explicit protection that the ADA guarantees to
persons who are disabled due to means other than a physical
handicap.8 2 For example, the ADA would prohibit a restaurant
that is physically accessible in every way from refusing to sell its
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria
can be shown to be necessary... ;
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to
individuals with disabilities... ; [and]
(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or
otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence
of auxiliary aids and services ....
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
77 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
78 Petruzzelli, supra note 7, at 1081.
79 Id. (positing this hypothetical in order to show that the ADA should be
applicable to more forms of discrimination involving a public accommodation than
just physical access).
80 The ADA defines a person with a disability as one who is physically or
mentally impaired, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
81 Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1322.
82 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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services to an individual who suffers from a mild mental
impairment. Thus, the inclusion of provisions that protect
individuals with non-physical handicaps demonstrates that
physical access is not the only concern contemplated by TitleIll.
Finally, the district court's "in-person" requirement would
render superfluous the ADA's "safe harbor" provision.8 3 The
"safe harbor" provision exempts health insurers
and other
similar organizations from the ADA's application to underwriting
risks and risk classification that is based on sound actuarial
principles.8 4 The implication of this provision is that the ADA
does regulate discrimination in underwriting that is not based on
sound actuarial principles.8 5 This is significant because the "safe
harbor" provision does not involve physical access issues
whatsoever.8 6 Therefore, if Title III were meant only to prevent
insurance companies, for example, from denying persons with
disabilities physical access to their offices, as the district court's
"in-person" requirement mandates, then there would have been
no need for Congress to include the "safe harbor" provision in the
87
Act.
The district court's analysis also fails to consider the ADA's
purpose and to examine the legislative intent of the Act. The
stated purpose of the ADA is "to invoke the sweep of
Congressional authority ...in order to address the major areas
of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities ,"88
and to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against [such] individuals."8 9
The purpose of Title III is "to bring individuals with disabilities
into the economic and social mainstream of American life ...in a

83

See id. § 12201(c)(1).

See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(11), at 137 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 420.
85 See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1999); Conners
v. Me. Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 1999); Winslow v. IDS Ins. Co., 29 F.
Supp. 2d. 557, 563 (D. Minn. 1998); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994
F. Supp. 1185, 1190-91 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.
Supp. 422, 425-27 (D.N.H. 1996); Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1322-23. In addition, the
ADA specifically states that the "safe harbor" provision "shall not be used as
subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
86 See Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
87 Chabner, 994 F. Supp. at 1190-91.
88 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
84

89 Id. § 12101(b)(1).
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clear, balanced, and reasonable manner."9 0 Congress' intent in
drafting Title III was to ensure that people with disabilities have
equal access to the same range of goods and services that are
offered by private institutions to those who do not have
disabilities. 9 ' "Neither Title III nor its implementing regulations
make any mention of physical boundaries or physical entry,"92
and the legislative history of the Act discloses that the "lack of
physical access to facilities" was only one of several "major areas
of discrimination that needed to be addressed." 93 Therefore, the
court's use of ejusdem generis and imposition of the self-created
"in-person" requirement are inappropriate as they both frustrate
Congress' intent and are inconsistent with the stated purpose of
94
the statute.
Finally, the court did not account for the historical context in
which the ADA was enacted. Although the Internet existed in
1990, it was in its infancy and not as widely used as a means of
transacting business and providing services as it is now. 95
Therefore, just because Congress may not have specifically
envisioned the application of Title III to websites in 1990, such
lack of foresight does not bar its application in the present. In
drafting
the twelve
enumerated
categories
of public
accommodations, Congress inserted the term "or other" followed
by a general term at the end of each category. 96 This method of
drafting suggests that Congress did not intend to make the list
exhaustive, but rather envisioned a broader application of the
90 Carparts Distribution. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England,

Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 99 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382).
91 Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I), at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 296.
92 Carparts,37 F.3d at 20.
93 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 35-36.
94 The Eleventh Circuit, in adopting as precedent "old Fifth" Circuit case law,
that which existed prior to the division of the Fifth Circuit into what is now the "new
Fifth" and Eleventh Circuits, in Bonner v. City of Prichard,661 F.2d 1206, 1207
(11th Cir. 1981), also adopted the notion of interpreting a statute so as to not defeat
its purpose. See Miller v. Amusement Enters. Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968)
("Although we recognize that ejusdem generis is an old and accepted rule of statutory
construction, we do not believe that it compels us... to interpret the statute in such
a narrow fashion as to defeat ... its obvious and dominating general purpose.").
95 Kara Grimes, Casenote, Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d
1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002), 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 203, 206-07 (2004) (suggesting that
court's should not limit the scope of the ADA's applicability merely because Congress
did not foresee how the Internet would evolve).
96 Id. at 207 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000)).
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statute to encompass entities related to those specifically
enumerated. 97 Further, if a website is considered a service
offered by an enumerated public accommodation, then it would
certainly be subject to ADA application by virtue of 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A), which defines the types of discrimination covered
98
by the Act.
B. Failureto ProperlyApply Prior Case Law

The district court's rationale failed to adequately address or
refute the reasoning contained in a significant volume of case law
related to the ADA's application to entities that do not conduct
business in-person. Such application was first considered in
1994, in the First Circuit's decision in Carparts Distribution
Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England.99

The court considered the issue of whether a public
accommodation is 'limited to actual physical structures with
definite physical boundaries which a person physically enters for
the purpose of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services
therein,"' or whether the term could be extended to include a
health benefit plan that was offered offsite via an employer
participant. 10 0 In rejecting a narrow interpretation, the court
examined both the plain meaning and purpose of the statute, as
well as Congress' intent in passing the ADA, 10 1 and concluded:
97 See id. (suggesting that the statutory language warrants broader applicability
of the statute); Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Complaint with
Prejudice, supra note 35, at 9 (citing Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212
(1998)). In Yeskey, the court stated that "Congress did not 'envisio[n] that the ADA
would be applied to state prisoners."' Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (quoting Brief for
Petitioners at 13-14, Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (No. 97-634)).
98 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
99 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1994). In Carparts,the plaintiff was the president and
employee of Carparts, Inc., a corporation that participates in a health benefit plan
offered by the defendant, Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England
("AWANE"). Id. at 14. The plaintiff was enrolled in the plan since 1977 and
contracted HIV in 1986. Id. In 1990, AWANE informed the plaintiff that it was
reducing benefits for "AIDS-related illnesses" to $25,000, while otherwise
maintaining lifetime benefits of $1 million per plan member. Id. Plaintiff brought
suit under Title III of the ADA claiming that the lifetime cap on benefits for
individuals with AIDS constituted "illegal discrimination on the basis of a
disability." Id.
100 Id. at 18 (quoting Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n
of New England, 826 F. Supp. 583, 586 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.
1994)).
101 In determining the plain meaning of "public accommodation," the court noted
that the enumerated categories of § 12181(7)(F) include "a 'travel service,' a 'shoe
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By including "travel service" among the list of services
considered
"public
accommodations,"
Congress
clearly
contemplated that "service establishments" include providers of
services which do not require a person to physically enter an
actual physical structure.
. Many goods and services are sold over the telephone or by
mail with customers never physically entering the premises of a
commercial entity to purchase the goods or services. To exclude
this broad category of businesses from the reach of Title III and
limit [its] application ... to structures which persons must
enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of the
purposes of the ADA and would severely frustrate Congress's
intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods,
services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately
10 2
to other members of the general public.
Furthermore, the court stated that, "It would be irrational to
conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase services
are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same
services over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could
not have intended such an absurd result."'0 3 Thus, the essence of
the First Circuit's holding is that the ADA applies to physical
places of business regardless of whether or not they conduct their
business in-person. 10 4 This holding has been followed by courts
10 5
in various jurisdictions.
In 1999, in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.,' 0 6 the
Second Circuit expanded the application of Title III to include
insurance underwriting practices.10 7 This expansion was also
based on an examination of the plain meaning of the ADA, read

repair service,'.

. .

and 'other service establishment[s],'.

.

. [t]he plain meaning of

[which] do not require 'public accommodations' to have physical structures for
persons to enter ....

This ....

considered together with agency regulations and

public policy concerns, persuades us that the phrase is not limited to actual physical
structures." Id. at 19.
102 Id. at 19-20.
103 Id. at 19.
104 See Petruzzelli, supra note 7, at 1072.
105 See supranote 28 (discussing authorities supporting Carparts).
106 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999).
107 Id. at 31. In Pallozzi, the defendant insurance company rejected a married
couple's request for a joint life insurance policy, and plaintiffs filed suit under Title
III, claiming that the rejection was based on the fact that they both had mental
disorders, and thus constituted prohibited discrimination. Id. at 30.
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in context, and its legislative purpose.10 8 The relevant context in
Pallozzi was the presence of the "safe harbor" provision of the
ADA that deals with underwriting and risk classification. 10 9 The
Second Circuit reasoned that the presence of this provision
implies that Title III does regulate insurance underwriting
practices subject only to the limitations contained in the safe
harbor provision. 110 Therefore, because this provision lacks a
physical access requirement, the Second Circuit declared that "an
entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by the statute to
provide disabled persons with physical access, but is also
prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by reason
of discrimination against their disability." '
Finally, and most on point to the discussion of the
application of the ADA to the Internet, is the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. 11 2 Although
the facts of the case were similar to Pallozzi, Chief Judge Posner
made the following statement concerning the "core meaning" of
Title III:
The core meaning of this provision, plainly enough, is that the
owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist's office,
travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in
physical space or in electronic space) that is open to the public
cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and,
once in, from using the facility in the same way that the
113
nondisabled do.
Although dicta, this statement expands Title III, as applied
in Carparts, from physical businesses whether or not they
conduct their business on an in-person basis, to businesses that
are simply "open to the public," whether or not they have any
11 4
physical offices.
108 Id. at 32-33. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California pronounced this expansion based on similar reasoning one year earlier, in
1998. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 118791(N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that based on the plain meaning of the statute and on its
legislative history, Title III protected a man suffering from muscular dystrophy from
price discrimination by his insurance company).
109See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
110 Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33.
111 Id.

at 33.

179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
113 Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
114 It is questionable whether this distinction has any significance given that
even the smallest web retailer would have to conduct his business from some
112

2005]

ACCESS NOW, INC. V. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, CO.

1331

The district court did not directly address or refute the
reasoning in any of these cases when determining the scope of
the term "public accommodation" and imposing its "in-person"
requirement. 115 Instead, the court characterized the language in
Carparts and Doe as dicta, 116 and deferred to Rendon as
superseding authority for this proposition. 1 17 However, Rendon
is not a proper authority on this issue as the Eleventh Circuit
never addressed the scope of the term "public accommodation,"
nor alluded to an "in-person" requirement in that case because
the defendants in Rendon conceded that they were a public
accommodation."18 Therefore, it appears that the only basis for
the district court's interpretation is that it mistook the facts of
Rendon as requirements."19
C. Misinterpretationof the "Nexus"Approach
The district court also erred when interpreting the "nexus"
approach by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate both a "nexus"
between the website and a public accommodation, and that the
website discriminates by impeding access to a "specific, physical,
While the first half of the court's
concrete space."' 20
interpretation is correct, the second half is exceedingly narrow as
"impeding physical access" is not a requirement of Rendon, but
merely a recital of its specific facts.' 2' The Eleventh Circuit
made this point clear when it stated, "this appeal involves only
the question of whether Title III encompasses a claim involving
telephonic procedures that, in this case, tend to screen out
disabled persons from participation in a competition held in a
tangible public accommodation." 122 The correct interpretation of
physical space, as humans have not yet evolved to live in cyberspace alone.
115 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.

Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002).
The facts of Rendon were that the public accommodation in question, a
television studio, happened to be one in which the privileges and advantages are
enjoyed onsite. Id.
120 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
121 In Rendon, the "fast finger" telephone selection process happened to serve as
a screening mechanism that prevented persons with disabilities from becoming
contestants on the show and thus "accessing" the physical television studio. Rendon,
294 F.3d at 1282.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
118
119
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the "nexus" approach is that once a plaintiff has established the
necessary "nexus," all of the protections of the ADA are
triggered, 123 not just those pertaining to physical access.
The district court attempted to justify its interpretation by
insinuating that the Eleventh Circuit was in accord with Parker
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 124 Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp.,12 5 and Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,126 and
that those cases espoused such a requirement. 127 In actuality,
the Eleventh Circuit only discussed those cases to refute the
defendant's arguments and to distinguish them on the basis of
their facts from Rendon. 128 The cases are distinguishable in that
the privilege sought by the plaintiffs in Rendon was offered
directly by the defendant public accommodation, whereas in
Weyer, Ford, and Parker, the challenged good was offered
through the plaintiffs' employers. 129 This was the grounds upon
which those cases were decided-not upon a failure of the
plaintiffs to prove that the defendants had impeded their
physical access to a place of public accommodation. 130

See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2000).
124 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that while an insurance
office is a public accommodation, plaintiff did not seek the services of a public
accommodation when she accessed her employee benefits plan directly though her
123

employer).
125 145 F.3d 601, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that no nexus exists between a
plaintiff and an insurance company that administers her employee benefits plan
when the plaintiff obtains her plan directly from her employer rather than through
insurance company itself).
126 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the Third and Sixth
Circuits and holding that an insurance company administering an employerprovided benefits plan is not a "place of public accommodation").
127 See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1320 n.10
(S.D. Fla. 2002) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit "recognized" those cases that did
not apply Carparts),appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
128 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002).
129

Id.

See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13 ("Since Ford received her disability benefits via
her employment at Schering, she had no nexus to MetLife's 'insurance office' and
thus was not discriminated against in connection with a public accommodation.");
Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1997) ('While we agree
that an insurance office is a place of public accommodation.., plaintiff did not seek
the goods and services of an insurance office. Rather, Parker accessed a benefit plan
provided by her private employer...."); Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115 ('We agree with
the Third and Sixth Circuits [Ford and Parker] and hold that an insurance company
administering an employer-provided disability policy is not a 'place of public
accommodation' under Title III."). No "impeding physical access" requirement of the
nexus approach appears in any of these cases.
130
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In addition to the lack of support for this interpretation in
Weyer, Ford, and Parker, a careful reading of Rendon reveals
that the Eleventh Circuit actually opposes such a requirement.
Because Rendon involved an offsite screening procedure, the
Eleventh Circuit was acutely conscious of Title III's applicability
to both tangible and intangible barriers. 131 Further, the court
noted that intangible barriers can be created by an entity's
refusal "to provide a reasonable auxiliary service that would
permit the disabled to gain access to or use its goods and
services."'132 The phrase "or use" suggests that intangible barrier
discrimination not only includes "impeding physical access," but
also impeding the use of goods and services, as separate and
distinct from the former.
Finally, the district court's interpretation of the "nexus"
of statutory
maxim
basic
approach contravenes the
133 in the same
"in-person"
its
as
manner
interpretation
requirement, as it renders the ADA inapplicable to many types of
discrimination that are enumerated in the Act that do not
explicitly relate to physical access. 3 4 Thus, the district court
lacks both statutory authority and precedential support for its
"in-person" requirement for "public accommodations" and its
"impeding physical access" requirement for the "nexus" approach.
D. Would a ProperApplication of the "Nexus"ApproachHave
Saved the Plaintiffs' Case?
Given the abundance of judicial error by the district court, it
would be easy to conclude that this fully explains the plaintiffs'
defeat. However, it is possible that they still could have won
their suit had they made the right allegations at the right time
and the court properly applied the "nexus" approach. At the
district court level, the plaintiffs only argued that websites
of "public
the meaning
within
included
be
should
35
accommodations" and did not pursue the "nexus" approach.
Therefore, they did not allege a connection between

131See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283.
132

added).

Id.

at 1283 n.7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000)) (emphasis

See supra Part II.A.
See supranote 75 and accompanying text.
135Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004).
133
134
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southwest.com and a physical place of public accommodation.1 3 6
The plaintiffs could have established this element by proving
that the website was in fact a service provided by a "travel
service" public accommodation (Southwest Airlines) that owns or
leases real property. 137 On this basis, the plaintiffs could then
have demonstrated that Southwest Airlines was discriminating
within the meaning of the ADA by failing to make reasonable
modifications to the website (e.g., making it compatible with
screen reader technology) in order to provide such a service to
persons with disabilities. 138
This application of the "nexus"
approach is consistent with the ADA's purpose of ensuring that
people with disabilities have equal access to the same range of
goods and services that are offered by private institutions and
made available to those who do not have disabilities. 1 39 Had the
plaintiffs pursued this strategy in the district court and upon
appeal, it is likely that the Eleventh Circuit would have granted
them relief based on their previous interpretation of the "nexus"
approach. 40 However, because the plaintiffs did not make these
arguments until the case progressed to the appellate level and
abandoned the arguments they made at the district court level,
we are left questioning the state of the law, as the Eleventh
Circuit declined to rule on the merits of either theory. 141
III. CONCERNS WITH BLANKET APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO ALL
WEBSITES

Some commentators have embraced reasoning like the
Seventh Circuit's dicta' 42 and advocate that all websites
constitute public accommodations because they are "open to the
public," and thus fall under the purview of the ADA. 143 Despite
the attraction and moral laudability of such an interpretation, it
136 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla.
2002), appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
137 By proving that Southwest is a "travel service" that owns or leases real
property, plaintiffs would have satisfied the district court's requirements for "public
accommodations." Id. at 1318. Specifically, owning or leasing real property should
satisfy the requirement of being a "physical, concrete structure." Id.
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2000).
139 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
141 Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1325.
142 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
143 See Schloss, supra note 5, at 58; Ranen supra note 2, at 418.
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is not without its own problems. In February of 2000, when
Congress held hearings on the subject, critics testified that
millions of web pages would have to be taken down, some
144 However, such a
permanently, due to the cost of modifications.
result is unlikely as the ADA contains various internal limits to
protect businesses subject to its regulation. For example, the
ADA does not require businesses to make modifications that
fundamentally alter the nature of the goods and services
provided, or to take other steps to eliminate discrimination, if
145 These internal
such steps would constitute an undue burden.
being
limitations would likely protect small web retailers from
"crushed by the weight of burdensome ADA compliance,"'1 46 while
ensuring that large commercial websites are accessible to
individuals with disabilities.
The most serious problem with applying the ADA across the
board to include all websites is that such an interpretation's
The ADA was enacted
constitutionality is highly dubious.
the Commerce Clause of
under
pursuant to Congress's authority
1 47
Therefore, in order for a
the United States Constitution.
website to constitutionally be subject to148 the ADA, it must
"substantially affect interstate commerce."'
In addition, as the
also requires that
ADA
the
out,
points
district court correctly
"public accommodations" be physical structures (i.e., be entities
1 49 Many non-retail and nonthat own or lease real property).
commercial websites that are either personal in nature or merely
provide information would arguably not satisfy these
requirements. Therefore, it is likely that the ADA's application
to websites would be limited to commercial websites. If broader
application is desired, the constitution requires a showing that
the challenged website has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce-a fact-intensive determination that would have to be
50
made on a case-by-case basis.

144
145
146
147

148
149

See Mockbee, supra note 6, at 571 (referencing this testimony by critics).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
See Mockbee, supra note 6, at 573.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.

150 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
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CONCLUSION

As the Internet continues to grow, so will the "digital divide"
so long as websites categorically do not have to comply with the
ADA. The district court's decision in Access Now is a step in the
wrong direction based on the faulty imposition of an "in-person"
requirement for public accommodations and an "impeding
physical access" requirement for the "nexus" approach. These
concocted requirements are without statutory authority or case
precedent as they do not comport with the plain meaning of the
ADA, read in context, its purpose, the intent of the legislature, or
prior case law.
Nevertheless, the district court's "physical
structure" interpretation of the term "public accommodation" is
well supported and will likely prevent websites from qualifying
for ADA application as entities unto themselves until either the
Supreme Court or Congress resolves the issue. In the meantime,
websites should be subject to the ADA so long as they are a
service offered by a physical place of public accommodation and a
"nexus" can be established between
the two.

